The coroner had a number so small it made the collision look as if it could be solved by arithmetic. One one-hundred-fifty-thousandth of a second. A human being could not live in that interval. An inheritance could turn on it. A deputy coroner wrote that Mrs. Rowley had died first by about 1/150 000 of a second. On cross-examination, he conceded that the figure was a rough mathematical guess. The appellate court did not adopt that fraction as its holding or as a finding. It affirmed a finding that her death had preceded her companion’s by an interval of time, supported by the physical evidence of the collision.

That interval mattered because it carried a legal consequence. Mrs. Rowley’s estate depended on the order of two deaths. The force of the collision could be traced from the side where she sat to the companion driving the car. The court could accept an order without endorsing the coroner’s computation. An interval could be true at a level of detail the record supported and false at a finer one.
The fraction is more than a curiosity. It shows how easily precision can be mistaken for knowledge. A long row of digits has a moral force that a vague answer lacks. It seems to say that the person who produced it must have done the work. The exact number arrives with its own little uniform of authority.
We like that uniform. It lets a difficult human event look administratively settled. A collision becomes a ratio. A deadline becomes a rule. A moment of grief becomes a coordinate on a line. Precision offers relief from the burden of interpretation, and that relief can be genuine. It can also be a way of avoiding the person whose body or livelihood is inside the event.
The number with a body attached
A real evidentiary interval can be much larger and still be honest. United States v. Obayagbona supplies two of them. Fourteen minutes and twenty-five seconds elapsed between Special Agent Michael Turner’s receipt of a heroin sample and his taped statement. Two minutes and twenty-five seconds elapsed between the arrest and that statement. Those coordinates were stipulated, which means the parties agreed to their precision.
Turner had posed as a purchaser in an undercover investigation. He testified that Florence Abieyuwa Obayagbona reached into a small black purse and handed him a folded paper towel containing a sample. Obayagbona and Ehimwema Onaiwu offered a different account in which Onaiwu used the purse without Obayagbona observing the sample’s placement. After the group left the restaurant, agents made the arrests. Turner’s recorder continued running while he was handcuffed as part of the undercover scenario. His recorded answer identified the person he said had supplied the sample: “The girl in the black and white [dress] handed it to me out of her purse.”
Judge Weinstein admitted the tape under Rule 803(1). He required near contemporaneity when precise simultaneity was impossible. Turner had spoken at his first opportunity, and the court treated that circumstance as supporting spontaneity. The opinion set no general maximum of fourteen minutes and twenty-five seconds. A different case with the same interval could present different opportunities for reflection.
The interval was exact. Its meaning still had to be interpreted.
The arrest gave Turner his first opportunity to speak freely. That fact carried more weight than a numerical limit imported from another case. The rule’s word “immediately” received an institutional interpretation through the circumstances. Near contemporaneity was the court’s judgment, not a stopwatch handed down from heaven.
Posner’s little dog
Judge Posner later used an ordinary example to attack the psychological premise underneath the temporal exceptions. An acquaintance asks whether a small dog is beautiful. The cat-loving listener answers yes while thinking the animal hideous. No dramatic event is needed for the lie to form at once.
Posner did not use the concurrence to rescue Darnell Boyce or to deny that existing precedents supported admission. He joined the judgment. His disagreement concerned the reliability theories that continued to justify the exceptions. A system can apply a rule and doubt it. The majority applied established law and affirmed. The concurrence accepted that result while questioning whether the rules deserved their traditional justification. The small dog clarifies what the concurrence does not prove. A social fib tells us nothing directly about Sarah Portis’s sincerity or Turner’s identification. It shows that spontaneity and sincerity are different properties. That distinction is the reliability theory’s problem, not a verdict on either witness.
A more honest interval
A database offers a different way to handle the same problem. TrueTime does not ask a clock for a single exact-looking numeral and then pretend the numeral settles everything. TT.now() returns a TTinterval with two endpoints, earliest and latest. The interval is guaranteed to contain the absolute time at which the call was invoked.
The timestamp eventually assigned to the transaction is a point chosen under the protocol. It is not the entire TTinterval returned to the caller. The upper bound helps the coordinator make that choice, and commit wait then asks whether the chosen point has definitely passed. Only after that point is safe can clients see the committed data. The wait is not a refusal to commit. Having already chosen a timestamp, the coordinator logs the commit record through Paxos. Assignment, durability, visibility, and lock release remain separate steps. The engineered interval replaces any pretense of an instantly shared present.
This is where precision becomes more than a figure. The protocol converts uncertainty into an operational constraint. A transaction can have a timestamp before clients are allowed to see its committed data. The official record’s time and the time of public visibility do not have to be identical. The system pays a delay to protect the consistency of its records.
The coroner’s guess offered a fraction. TrueTime offered endpoints. One was a guess that had to be withdrawn as a finding. The other was a guarantee about the range inside which the answer had to lie. Exactness and uncertainty are not enemies. They can occupy the same record when the record is designed to hold them.
When a court moves a date
A delayed decree can create the same confusion in a different form. The decree in Mitchell v. Overman was entered on November 10, 1872, as of October 16, 1868. It ordered Robert Mitchell and others to pay Conrad Stutzman $3,395.58 with interest at six percent from that earlier date. Stutzman had died on November 10, 1869.
The Supreme Court treated the state court’s power over its own judgment as the procedural answer. Where a court’s business, convenience, or the difficulty of the questions delayed judgment, the decree could be entered retrospectively as of a time when it should or might have been entered. Delay caused by the parties’ own laches stood on different ground. Actus curiae neminem gravabit: an act of the court shall prejudice no one. That power did not depend on pretending that the later entry had happened earlier. The record showed both dates. It showed when the decree was entered and the date as of which it took effect. Nunc pro tunc supplied a lawful relation between them.
Entry occurred in 1872. Representation pointed to 1868. Legal effect ran from the represented date under the decree’s own terms. Stutzman’s death in 1869 belonged to the case’s history and did not make either date false.
The retrospective device has a narrow job. It reflects something that happened or should have happened in the record. It cannot manufacture a judicial act that never existed.
Acevedo Feliciano shows the attempted shortcut. A federal district court remanded a case to the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance on August 20, 2018, and made the remand effective as of March 13, 2018. Nothing had occurred in the federal case on that earlier date.
The Archdiocese had removed the case to federal court on February 6, 2018. The Puerto Rico court issued payment and seizure orders on March 16, March 26, and March 27. Those dates fell after removal and before remand, while the federal statute barred the state court from proceeding further unless the case was remanded. The district court tried to address that defect through its nunc pro tunc remand. An effective date of March 13 would have placed remand before the payment and seizure orders. The device would therefore have supplied the Puerto Rico court with jurisdiction at the time it acted.
The Supreme Court rejected that use. Nunc pro tunc orders reflect the reality of what has already occurred. They presuppose a decree that was allowed or ordered but not entered through the court’s inadvertence. They cannot make the record what it is not.
That limit differs from Mitchell’s permission in a material way. Mitchell involved a cause already submitted, with entry delayed through the court’s own act. Acevedo involved an attempted effective date with no corresponding event in the federal record. One device reflected a delayed decree, while the other attempted to manufacture jurisdiction.
The 2020 opinion did not cite Mitchell v. Overman. The relationship between the cases is therefore an analytical comparison, not a claimed line of precedent drawn by the Court itself. Each holding remains attached to its own record and authorities.
The hundredth that counts
Authorized precision has its own discipline. On August 16, 2008, the men’s 100-metre butterfly final at Beijing produced two displayed times. Michael Phelps touched in 50.58 seconds, and Milorad Čavić touched in 50.59. The scoreboard placed Phelps first and Čavić second. Their displayed difference was one hundredth of a second, the precision used by the governing rule.
The rule in force matters because the scoreboard’s precision is authorized precision. FINA’s Swimming Rules for 2005 through 2009 supplied SW 11.2 for Beijing. When Automatic Equipment was used, results had to be recorded only to the hundredth of a second. The electronic scoreboard was also limited to that display. The same rule addressed finer available timing. Its operative clause said that “the third digit shall not be recorded or used to determine time or placement.” Availability of thousandths did not make thousandths eligible to decide the official order. The rule limited both recording and use for that purpose. Equal times received a different consequence. Swimmers who recorded the same time at the hundredth were accorded the same placing. A tie under the rule was a result produced by authorized precision, not a claim that the physical touches were simultaneous in every measurable respect.
The page that remains
The public death notice for Betty Lorraine Tittel records her death in Ord, Nebraska, on December 16, 2017. She was ninety-four years old. The notice from Govier Brothers Mortuary and Crematory places her death in that town. Then it turns to the people who remain: “She is survived by her husband of 60 years, Kenneth Tittel of Taylor, Nebraska.”
Betty is the grammatical subject. Kenneth stands in the by-phrase with his marriage’s length and his town. The clause does not say that Betty continues to exist. It uses a conventional form to name the person who survived her, rather than assigning her a continued share in the present tense.
The rest of the notice places that sentence within a larger family stage. It names their three children: Colleen Richards of Alaska, Bradley Tittel of Norfolk, Nebraska, and Tina Hyde of Taylor, Nebraska. It also names eight grandchildren and three great-grandchildren without giving their names. The survivor clause sits inside that larger family stage. The public page thus carries several documentary presents. A life is narrated in the past, a death is reported, survivors are named, gratitude is expressed, and a memorial is anticipated. The auxiliary in “is survived by” belongs to that arrangement rather than to a claim that time has stopped for Betty. The date printed beside Betty’s name records her death on December 16, 2017. It is not a documented publication timestamp. The survivor clause belongs to the notice’s composition after that death, and the page does not establish the exact day on which the funeral home first published it.
Betty Tittel died on December 16, 2017. In the notice composed after her death, Kenneth is named as her surviving husband. The public page retrieved on November 15, 2026 read: “She is survived by her husband of 60 years, Kenneth Tittel of Taylor, Nebraska.”
The exact number can be a refuge from the person whose body is inside the event. It can also be a way of taking responsibility. A coroner’s fraction had to be withdrawn as a finding. A court’s interval could be accepted because the physical evidence supported it. TrueTime’s endpoints make uncertainty visible without making the system useless. A decree can preserve two dates when the record carries both, but a date cannot create an act that never happened. A swimming rule can decide a medal without claiming to know the exact interval between two hands. A death notice can name a survivor without promising anything about the survivor’s future. These are not failures of precision. They are examples of precision doing its proper work, bounded by evidence and by the authority that gives a record its consequence.
If you’re interested in learning more about how records assign authority to moments, my book, Nothing Is
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